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In_ The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
- vs -

GLEN HESS SELMAN,

Case No.
10544

Defendant-Appellant.

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The statement contained in the appellant's brief
adequately indicates the nature of the case.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The statement of the disposition in the appellant's brief adequately sets forth the happenings in
the lower court.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent, State of Utah, submits that the
verdict of the trial court should be affirmed.

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statemcin!
of facts:
......

1

On June 9, 1965, Carol Ann Sylvester, a house
wife who resided in Thatcher, Box Elder Coun+·; ·
Utah, was driving on Rocket Road in that counti·
taking twelve children to school ITr. 10). An accider.~
occurred approximately four miles from Tremonto:
at an intersection of Rocket Road which runs e: 2 1
and west with a dirt road which runs north ano ·
south (Tr. 11). The accident occurred at approximate
ly 8:00 a.m. (Tr. 11). The aay was a cloudless, sunn-: 1
dry, warm day with no weather imped)ments re
1
visibility (Tr. 27). Mrs. Sylvester had traveled th
road on previous occasions and was going eas! :
approximately 60 miles per hour prior to the acc1 '
dent (Tr. 11). There is a stop sign at the intersectic~ I
with Rocket Road of the gravel road which control:·
the north-south traffic. On the southwest comer~ ·
a small farmhouse with trees and corrals (Tr. !I'. I
Mrs. Sylvester testified that as she approached th 1
intersection, a Pontiac vehicle, which was appare~ 1, i
ly driven by the appellant, ran the stop sign, ar.c].
Mrs. Sylvester could not stop her car or even app.
her brakes before she struck the vehicle. The le;
1
front of her car struck the front area of the appellan '
vehicle (Tr. 13). It then veered off and struck an!:
rigation ditch. As a result of the accident, Ken~;
Okada, age 10, who was riding with Mrs. Sylvest~:
was killed (Tr. 13). Mrs. Sylvester indica'.ed th~t~;
had not at any time observed the car dnven Y

1
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appellant south of the stop sign and that she would
estimate the speed of the vehicle at between 45 and
50 miles per hour when she struck the appellant's
vehicle (Tr. 18). She said that she had seen a cloud
of dust from the appellant's vehicle approximately
l /8 to 1 I 4 of a mile down the dirt road that intersected with Rocket Road (Tr. 19). She testified that
no horn was sounded by the appellant (Tr. 21), and
that the house on the corner blocks one's vision of
the intersection (Tr. 20). The speed limit in the area
·was 60 miles per hour.
Highway trooper Boyd Jensen identified various exhibits, which were photographs of the intersection and the vehicle, showing the extent of the
damage (Tr. 28-29). These pictures showed tremendous damage to the Dodge vehicle, which was being driven by Mrs. Sylvester, as well as the Pontiac
vehicle driven by the appellant. Officer Jensen indicated that he noted trucks around the home on the
corner of the intersection at the time of the accident.
He testified that he observed approximately 15 feet
of skid marks from each vehicle into the intersection. Approximately 9 feet of the skid marks were
on the gravel portion of the road intersecting with
Rocket Road (Tr. 41). Officer Jensen further indicated
that the stop sign was visible approximately 1,000
feet away from the intersection (Tr. 52). He further
indicated that in running a skid test, the comparable
skid at 30 miles per hour was substantially greater
than the skid from the appellant's car (Tr. 51).
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Appellant's counsel brought out on cross-ez.
amination that the appellant had been arrested b·i
Trooper Jensen for driving during a period oi r~
voked license (Tr. 67), but that the charge had a"
parently been dismissed.
!-'
Trooper Scott Lee of the Highway Patrol es:i
mated from the physical evidence of skid and scu!:
marks that the appellant's vehicle was going at c
minimum speed of 40 miles per hour before hs
started his skid and the Sylvester vehicle at 55 miles
per hour. A careful explanation of the difference m
computations on the estimated speed of the Dodge
vehicle from the testimony given by Trooper Lee
at the time of preliminary hearing was provided al :
trial. The difference was based upon an apparent I
effort to make a more precise mathematical calculc·
tion (Tr. 83). Trooper Lee indicated that the appel- 1•
lant's vehicle would have gone 641/2 feet durin; i
the reaction period from the time appellant wouid ,
have observed the danger until the starting of his
skid.
,1

The appellant's contention was that he was driv·
ing his Pontiac going to Pocatello Valley to go !:J
work. He had traveled the road before and knew
of the stop sign and the intersection (Tr. 113). HE
testified that he stopped before entering the inte:section, entered the intersection, and was struci
(Tr. 113-114). On cros-examination, there was some
indication that the appellant may have skiddee:
into the intersection and observed the danger anc
accelerated (Tr. 117).
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At the close of the State's case and at the close

oJ the trial, appellant made a motion to dismiss the
'.'ase, which was denied by the trial judge. No exceptions were taken by the appellant to the instructions given by the court. The jury retired at 12:04
nm. and reached a verdict at 1:03 p.m., finding the
aooellant guilty of the crime of negligent homicide.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT.

The sole contention of the appellant on appeal
1s that the evidence presented at the time of trial
was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict and the
trial court's judgment. It is submitted that there is
no merit to the appellant's position.
It is well established that this court would be
Justified in reversing the jury's verdict only if it
were to conclude from a consideration of all the
2vidence and inferences viewed in a light most
favorable tc the jury's verdict that reasonable men
could not have reached such a conclusion. State v.
Berchtold, 11 U.2d 208, 353 Pac. 183 (1960). It is submitted that the facts in this case are clearly sufficient
to establish the appellant's guilt when the evidence
18
weighed in a light most favorable to the conviction.
Negligent homicide, as defined in Section 41-6-

~(~0), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, only requires
the death of an individual result within one
Year us the proximate result of the driving of a vet d,

6

hide in "reckless disregard for the safety of others.'
It should be noted that the statute does not requirn
that the vehicle be driven in reckless disregard Ci 1
the lives of others. The standard is merely that ths
operation of the vehicle be of such a reckless na.
ture or evidence such heedlessness that the safet·I
of others is in danger. Had the appellant operate.~
his vehicle in reckless disregard of the lives of oths1
persons, or in such a manner as would be great!'.- ,
dangerous to the lives of others, he could hav~
been charged with first degree murder. Sectio~
76-30-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
1

Respondent respectfully directs the court's attention to the case of the People v. Dunleavy, [194~1 I
Irish Reports 95, Court of Criminal Appeals of Erie, '
where Justice Davitt in very clear and appropriate
language spoke on the difference between the
standard of action necessary to sustain a conviction
in the face of a standard of reckless disregard for '
safety, as distinct from reckless disregard for life. The :
court stated:
I
1

"To say that a person is driving with a reckless disre·
gard for life means that he does not care .whe~er he I
kills anybody or not. Such a state of mmd will or·
amarily, but perhaps not universally, amount ro gen·
eral malice sufficient to justify a conviction for mur:
der. To say that a person is driving with a reckles'
disregard for the safety of others, may mean mo::
than that he does not care whether or not e ~'
them in danger. This may amount to no m~re as~
dangerous driving. To associate these two ide .
'bl to un·
not to achieve the desired mean, but pos~i 1 frr·
port an ambiguity. On the other ~and, if t .~ ~ ; 11
ence to recklessness is merely omitted, the l IJ

io
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hardly given all the assistance which they are entitled to expect.
This court is of the opinion that a more satisfactory
way of indicating to a jury the high degree of negligence necessary to j~stify a c~nvictioi:i f<?r manslaughter is to relate it to the nsk or likelihood of
substantial personal injury resulting from it, rather
than to attach any qualification to the word 'negligence' or to the driver's disregard for the life or safety of others. In this connection the American case of
Commonwealth v. Welansky, a decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, is of very considerable
interest.
If the negligence proved is of a very high degree

and of such a character that any reasonable driver,
endowed with ordinary road sense and in full possession of his faculties, would realize, if he thought at
all, that by driving in the manner which occasioned
the fatality he was, without lawful excuse, incurring,
in a high degree, the risk of causing substantial personal injury to others, the crime of manslaughter appears clearly to be established."

It is submitted that this is the standard that this
court reached in the case of State v. Berchtold. 11
U.2d 208, 353 Pac. 183 (1960), where this court was
first called upon to construe the requisite standard
of the Utah Negligent Homicide Act. This court in addressing itself to the standard stated:
"* * * Our statute only requires reckless disrega1·d
for the safety of others, which is a much greater lack
of care than ordinary negligence, but does not require
a~ great ~ consciousness of the danger confronted as
wilful misconduct required to create civil liability
under our guest statute. To be 'reckless' does not
require 'wilfulness' but means rather heedless, careless, and rash inadvertence to consequences."

8
The court made it very clear that an intentional a.cc:.
dent or a choosing of a highly dangerous couroc
while conscious of the danger was not required:
but that the evidence must be such that, had the defendant stopped and considered, he would ha.ve
realized that he had made the choice of a course
marked with grave and serious dangers. T'.1e cc~'.·
expressly said:

I

"This does not require a finding that the defendan·
was fully conscious of the great danger to others.

It is submitted that the very clear and precise l:i.~
guage in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Ar '
peals of Erie to the effect that "any reasonable
driver endowed with ordinary road sense and b
full possession of his faculties would realize, if he
thought at all," is the standard to be applied in de· i
termining the element of consciousness. Indeed, ths
word "heedless" as used by this court in the Berc~: i
told case implies that the operator of a vehicle neea :
not be conscious in that he intends the accident
but might be quite indifferent to the actual dangs:
involved.

1

1

In State v. Park. 17 U.2d 90, 404 P.2d 677 (1965i,
this court stated, in affirming a conviction for negl!·
gent homicide:
· · is· baseo'
"The statute upon which the conVIction
Section 41-6-43.10, U.C.A. 1953, provides t~at, onke
. I rec·
who causes death by driving a motor ve h1c em . h'
less disregard of the safety of others' shall be guil ·
of negligent homicide.

1

g
The term 'reckless disregard of the safety of others'
of course implies a much greater dereliction in hazarding the safety of others ~han or~inary negligence.
However, it does not reqmre any mtent to do harm
either generally, or to the victim in particular. What
is essential is that it be shown beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant drove in a manner that he
knew, or should have known, was highly dangerous
to others, and that he did so intentionally, or heedlesslv with a careless indifference to the consequendes. This court has said that the 'doing of an
act fraught with the potentiality of producing death
amounts to such a reckless disregard for the safety
of others' that it will justify a conviction of this
r,rime."

Thus, it can be seen that the standard applicable
under the negligent homicide statute is the same as
the standard applied under the manslaughter statute, where the individual would enact malum prohibitum, smce this court required that the act be
done in a manner which evidenced a disregard for
the safety of others. State v. Lingman. 97 Utah 180, 91
P.2d 457. Applying the judicial standard noted
above, and taking the facts in a light most favorable
to the trial court's verdict, it is submitted that the
jury and the tnal court were both justified in concluding that the evidence demonstrated a reckless
disregard on the part of the appellant for the safety
of others.

The appellant, by his own admission, had traveled on the road before; he knew that there was a
stop sign at the end of the road; he knew that there
was an intersection on which cars could be traveling in an opposite direction. The stop sign was

10
visible 1,000 feet down the road. According to Mr
Sylvester, the appellant's car approached the sto~
sign in a cloud of dust. Although the appellant testi- '
fied that he stopped at the sign, Mrs. Sylvester teshfied that he did not. The testimony of the Highway
Patrol trooper, based on the physical evidence, is
completely contrary to the appellant's, thus iustilying the jury in completely disregarding the testimony of the appellant. falsus in uno, falsus in omni·
bus. Appellant made no effort to sound his horn and
must certainly have appreciated the serious danger
that would be involved in running a stop sign.
Further, having traveled the same road before, ap- i
pellant was undoubtably aware of the obstructions
to vision that would prevent him from fully viewing
approaching traffic and prevent drivers on the main
road from having a full view of the danger of anyone ignoring the stop sign. The jury would have !
been justified in concluding that the appellant deliberately failed to stop at the stop sign and intended
to travel on through, and but for the Sylvester ve· ,
hide, would have made no effort to make a full and
complete stop, as required. The whole pattern of
driving conduct of the appellant indicates that he
was heedless as to the consciousness of his act ar.ci
took a course of action which recklessly endangered
the lives of others and, in fact, brought death to a
10-year-old school boy.
1

1

Other decisions from this court have clearly
found comparable fact situations to present sufficient evidence to justify the jury in returning a guilty
verdict.

11
In State v. Anderson, 100 Utah 468, 116 P.2d 398

rJ941), a challenge was made to the sufficiency of

the

evidence, where the defendant was charged
with involuntary manslaughter by the operation of
a motor vehicle. This court recited the evidence as
follows:

"The uncontroverted evidence discloses that Anderson was proceeding northward on Third East. Clark
Romney was traveling westward on Twenty First
South, a through highway. On the southeast comer
of the intersection and facing south was the usual
state highway 'stop' sign.
Mr. Silcox and Mr. Engstrom, two eyewitnesses, testified that they saw the two automobiles as they approached the intersection. Their testimony is that
they saw Anderson enter the intersection at a speed
of between 40 and 45 miles an hour. No stop was
made before entering the intersection. The Anderson
automobile collided with the Romney automobile a
few feet north of the center of the intersection. The
Romney automobile went up in the air five or six feet
and rolled over twice before coming to a stop between
the curb and sidewalk. Romney was thrown from the
automobile and died from the injuries received."

After reviewing the assignments of error, the court
ruled the evidence sufficient and affirmed the conviction.
Of importance in demonstrating what conduct
is recklessly in disregard of the safety of others, th•~
decision of State v. Riddle. 112 Utah 356, 188 P.2d
449 (1948), warrants consideration. In that case, this
court affirmed a conviction of involuntary manslaughter. The apparent sole evidence of negligence was that the appellant operated a vehicle on
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ihe wrong side of the road. It did not appear the.r
he had operated his vehicle for any great length ol
time on the wrong side of the road. In discussino
the evidence, this court stated:
·
"Whether or not it is criminal negligence to drive
an automobile in such a manner that all or part of
it extends over the center line of a highway must
necessarily depend upon all of the surrounding circumstances. We do not say that in every case it j;
criminal negligence for a driver to permit part of hi'
vehicle to project over the center line and onto tb.t
left hand side of the highway. Under some circum- '
stances such conduct might not amount to criminal
negligence. But where a driver enters a blind curve
in the darkness of the night, and permits his auto·
mobile to get onto the left side of the road, and fails
to see an automobile approaching in a lawful manner
from the opposite direction, reasonable minds not
only might fairly conclude that he was guilty of
'reckless conduct or conduct evincing a marked disregard for the safety of others,' but could hardly conclude otherwise.
The record does not show the degree of the curve
upon which the collision took place, nor does it indicate whether or not the curve was blind. However,
the witnesses described it as a 'bad turn,' 'a danger·
ous curve,' 'a pronounced curve,' etc. And it is clear
from defendan~s own testimony that he (Riddle)
did not see the Wells vehicle until an instant before
the crash (too late to apply the brakes or to turn
aside). It is therefore inferable, in fact practically in·
escapable, that either he did not see what he should
have seen, or the curve was so blind that his range ?t
view was very limited, and that by failing to rerna1?
on his own side of the road he was criminally negh·
gent."

A case which directly sheds light on the fact
situation presented by this appeal is State v. Barker,
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113 Utah 514, 196 P.2d 723 (1948). In that case, the

appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, as well as claims instructional error of the
trial court. This court reversed on the grounds of
instructional error, but ordered a new trial finding
that the evidence was sufficient to have justified a
ury verdict of guilty. The defendant had been
traveling north and the victim east. The defendant
ran a stop sign, resulting in a collision and the death
of the occupant of the other car. The facts bear striking resemblance to those in the instant case. It was
observed:
"So if the driver, after carefully ascertaining that no
traffic was approaching in the 'thru' highway, after
he had all but completely stopped at the stop sign,
ran down and killed a pedestrian who suddenly darted
in front of the car, there would be no criminal negligence. On the other hand, if at the time the driver
all but completely stopped at the stop sign, there was
traffic in the thru highway approaching so near that
a collision could not be avoided, death from such a
collision to a person in the car approaching on the
thru highway would present a jury question on the
criminal negligence of the driver of the car that all
but completely stopped at the stop sign. So, while
defendant is correct in his contention that the facts
as far as they go in the illustration are the same as
in the present case, that illustration did not contemplate the additional facts here presented, that
when the defendant entered the intersection the other
car ~as approaching on the thru highway so near
that it constituted an immediate hazard and so that
'
case ts no authority for defendant's contention that
th~ facts here do not support a finding that he was
gwlty of criminal negligence.

.
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Here it would make little difference whether he
stopped at the stop sign or not. The fact that h
tered this intersection at a time when anothe: en.
to
.
car
.
was approac h mg so near as
constitute an imm d"
ate hazard made it highly dangerous to the occup~;,
of that car regardless of whether he came to a com:
pl.ete stop, or mer~ly slowed down or drove through
without even slowmg down. The thing that created
the danger was the fact that he entered the intersection when a car which had the right of way over hin1
was approaching and that he failed to yield the righ1
of way and thereby caused the accident. It was his
duty under those circumstances to look and be sure
that there was no car approaching so near as to create
an immediate hazard before he drove his car into the
intersection. This duty in this respect was just as
great if he came to a full stop as if he failed to stop.
The fact that there was a stop sign should have told
him not only that he must stop, but that if there was
a car approaching, the driver would expect him to
yield the right of way, and that it would be highly i
dangerous for him to proceed into the intersection
without first ascertaining that no car was approach·
ing so near as to constitute an immediate hazard. If
under these circumstances his failure to yield was the
result of inattention on his part or because of his
failure to observe and see in time that there was"
car approaching on the intersectiong highway, or if he 1
saw the approaching car in time to yield the right
of way and failed to do so, then the jury from th?se
facts would he justified in finding that he was ~ty
of conduct which was reckless or in marked disre·
gard for the safety of others. That inattention.to the
traffic and other persons on the highway which re·
suits in a driver's failure to avoid great danger and
injury to others who are on the highway, has been
repeatedly held by this court to constitute reckless·
ness and to justify a verdict of manslaughter. See
v Thatcher supra where the driver failed to
Sta'"i.c
•
'
observe
pedestrians' who were
walking on the 8h0u]der
of the highway in front of him. State v. Newton,
1
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supra, where a driver turned his vehicle into the
course of a car approaching from the opposite direction. State v. Riddle, supra, where the driver drove
his car around a curve partly on the wrong side of
the highway and ran into a car approaching from
the opposite direction. The evidence was sufficient
to justify the court in submitting the case to the jury,
but on account of the erroneous instructions, the
case is reversed and remanded for a new trial."

As can be seen from the Barker case, this court has
ruled in a comparable fact situation to that now before the court, that the evidence justified submission of the matter to the jury for its determination. In
the instant case, the jury had full opportunity to hear
the witnesses, observe their demeanor on the stand,
and judge their credibility. The facts, when taken
in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, clearly
do not demonstrate that the jury and the trial judqe
were unreasonable men. There is no basis for a
reversal.
CONCLUSION
In the instant case, the matter of the appellant's
guilt was clearly presented to the jury on a cleor
and unobstructed presentation of the facts. No exceptions to the trial court's instructions were taken
by the appellant. The jury was, therefore, clearly
apprised of the law and weighed the conduct of the
appellant as against the requisite legal standard.
The facts, when viewed in a light most favorable to
the iury's verdict, justify the conclusion the jury
reached and support the trial court's judgment.

16

There is no basis for reversal. This court shci~;::
affirm.
Respectfully submitted.

PHIL L. HANSE:t-;
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Assistant Attorney Genera:
Attorneys for Respondent

